

Gilligan

3 Concepts

of Self and Morality

COLLEGE STUDENT, responding to the question "If you had to say what morality meant to you, how would you sum it up?" replies:

A When I think of the word *morality*, I think of obligations. I usually think of it as conflicts between personal desires and social things, social considerations, or personal desires of yourself versus personal desires of another person or people or whatever. Morality is that whole realm of how you decide these conflicts. A moral person is one who would decide by placing themselves more often than not as equals. A truly moral person would always consider another person as their equal . . . In a situation of social interaction, something is morally wrong where the individual ends up screwing a lot of people. And it is morally right when everyone comes out better off.

Yet when asked if she can think of someone whom she considers a genuinely moral person, she replies, "Well, immediately I think of Albert Schweitzer, because he has obviously given his life to help others." Obligation and sacrifice override the ideal of equality, setting up a basic contradiction in her thought.

Another undergraduate responds to the question "What does it mean to say something is morally right or wrong?" by also speaking first of responsibilities and obligations:

It has to do with responsibilities and obligations and values, mainly values. . . . In my life situation I relate morality with interpersonal relationships that have to do with respect for the other person and myself. (*Why respect other people?*) Because they have a consciousness or feelings that can be hurt, an awareness that can be hurt.

The concern about hurting others persists as a major theme in the responses of two other women students to the question "Why be moral?"

Millions of people have to live together peacefully. I personally don't want to hurt other people. That's a real criterion, a main criterion for me. It underlies my sense of justice. It isn't nice to inflict pain. I empathize with anyone in pain. Not hurting others is important in my own private morals. Years ago I would have jumped out of a window not to hurt my boyfriend. That was pathological. Even today, though, I want approval and love, and I don't want enemies. Maybe that's why there is morality—so people can win approval, love, and friendship.

My main principle is not hurting other people as long as you aren't going against your own conscience and as long as you remain true to yourself. . . . There are many moral issues, such as abortion, the draft, killing, stealing, monogamy. If something is a controversial issue like these, then I always say it is up to the individual. The individual has to decide and then follow his own conscience. There are no moral absolutes. Laws are pragmatic instruments, but they are not absolutes. A viable society can't make exceptions all the time, but I would personally. . . . I'm afraid I'm heading for some big crisis with my boyfriend someday, and someone will get hurt, and he'll get more hurt than I will. I feel an obligation not to hurt him, but also an obligation not to lie. I don't know if it is possible not to lie and not to hurt.

The common thread that runs through these statements is the wish not to hurt others and the hope that in morality lies a way of solving conflicts so that no one will be hurt. This theme is independently introduced by each of the four women as the most specific item in their response to a most general question. The

moral person is one who helps others; goodness is service, meeting one's obligations and responsibilities to others, if possible without sacrificing oneself. While the first of the four women ends by denying the conflict she initially introduced, the last woman anticipates a conflict between remaining true to herself and adhering to her principle of not hurting others. The dilemma that would test the limits of this judgment would be one where helping others is seen to be at the price of hurting the self.

The reticence about taking stands on "controversial issues," a willingness to "make exceptions all the time," is echoed repeatedly by other college women:

I never feel that I can condemn anyone else. I have a very relativistic position. The basic idea that I cling to is the sanctity of human life. I am inhibited about impressing my beliefs on others.

I could never argue that my belief on a moral question is anything that another person should accept. I don't believe in absolutes. If there is an absolute for moral decisions, it is human life.

Or as a thirty-one-year-old graduate student says when explaining why she would find it difficult to steal a drug to save her own life, despite her belief that it would be right to steal for another: "It's just very hard to defend yourself against the rules. I mean, we live by consensus, and if you take an action simply for yourself, by yourself, there's no consensus there, and that is relatively indefensible in this society now."

What emerges in these voices is a sense of vulnerability that impedes these women from taking a stand, what George Eliot regards as the girl's "susceptibility" to adverse judgments by others, which stems from her lack of power and consequent inability "to do something in the world" (p. 365). The unwillingness to make moral judgments that Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) and Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) associate with the adolescent crisis of identity and belief takes the form in men of calling into question the concept of morality itself. But these women's reluctance to judge stems rather from their uncertainty about their right to make moral statements, or perhaps from the price for them that such judgment seems to entail.

When women feel excluded from direct participation in society, they see themselves as subject to a consensus or judgment made and enforced by the men on whose protection and support they depend and by whose names they are known. A divorced middle-aged woman, mother of adolescent daughters, resident of a sophisticated university community, tells the story:

As a woman, I feel I never understood that I was a person, that I could make decisions and I had a right to make decisions. I always felt that that belonged to my father or my husband in some way, or church, which was always represented by a male clergyman. They were the three men in my life: father, husband, and clergyman, and they had much more to say about what I should or shouldn't do. They were really authority figures which I accepted. It only lately has occurred to me that I never even rebelled against it, and my girls are much more conscious of this, not in the militant sense, but just in the recognizing sense . . . I still let things happen to me rather than make them happen, than make choices, although I know all about choices. I know the procedures and the steps and all. (*Do you have any clues about why this might be true?*) Well, I think in one sense there is less responsibility involved. Because if you make a dumb decision, you have to take the rap. If it happens to you, well, you can complain about it. I think that if you don't grow up feeling that you ever have any choices, you don't have the sense that you have emotional responsibility. With this sense of choice comes this sense of responsibility.

The essence of moral decision is the exercise of choice and the willingness to accept responsibility for that choice. To the extent that women perceive themselves as having no choice, they correspondingly excuse themselves from the responsibility that decision entails. Childlike in the vulnerability of their dependence and consequent fear of abandonment, they claim to wish only to please, but in return for their goodness they expect to be loved and cared for. This, then, is an "altruism" always at risk, for it presupposes an innocence constantly in danger of being compromised by an awareness of the trade-off that has been made. Asked to describe herself, a college senior responds:

I have heard of the onion-skin theory. I see myself as an onion, as a block of different layers. The external layers are

for people that I don't know that well, the agreeable, the social, and as you go inward, there are more sides for people I know that I show. I am not sure about the innermost, whether there is a core, or whether I have just picked up everything as I was growing up, these different influences. I think I have a neutral attitude toward myself, but I do think in terms of good and bad. Good—I try to be considerate and thoughtful of other people, and I try to be fair in situations and be tolerant. I use the words, but I try and work them out practically. Bad things—I am not sure if they are bad, if they are altruistic or I am doing them basically for approval of other people. (*Which things are these?*) The values that I try to act out. They deal mostly with interpersonal relations . . . If I were doing things for approval, it would be a very tenuous thing. If I didn't get the right feedback, there might go all my values.

Ibsen's play *A Doll's House* depicts the explosion of just such a world through the eruption of a moral dilemma that calls into question the notion of goodness which lies at its center. Nora, the "squirrel wife," living with her husband as she lived with her father, puts into action this conception of goodness as sacrifice and, with the best of intentions, takes the law into her own hands. The crisis that ensues, most painfully for her in the repudiation of that goodness by the very person who was its recipient and beneficiary, causes her to reject the suicide that she initially saw as its ultimate expression and to choose instead to seek new and firmer answers to questions of identity and moral belief.

The availability of choice, and with it the onus of responsibility, has now invaded the most private sector of the woman's domain and threatens a similar explosion. For centuries, women's sexuality anchored them in passivity, in a receptive rather than an active stance, where the events of conception and childbirth could be controlled only by a withholding in which their own sexual needs were either denied or sacrificed. That such a sacrifice entailed a cost to their intelligence as well was seen by Freud (1908) when he tied the "undoubted intellectual inferiority of so many women" to "the inhibition of thought necessitated by sexual suppression" (p. 199). The strategies of withholding and denial that women have employed in the politics of sexual relations appear similar to their evasion or withholding of judgment in the moral realm. The best chance of college students to assert a belief even in the value of

human life, like the reluctance to claim one's sexuality, bespeaks a self uncertain of its strength, unwilling to deal with choice, and avoiding confrontation.

Thus women have traditionally deferred to the judgment of men, although often while intimating a sensibility of their own which is at variance with that judgment. Maggie Tulliver in *The Mill on the Floss* responds to the accusations that ensue from the discovery of her secretly continued relationship with Phillip Wakelam by acceding to her brother's moral judgment, while at the same time asserting a different set of standards by which she attests to her own superiority:

I don't want to defend myself . . . I know I've been wrong—often continually. But yet, sometimes when I have done wrong, it has been because I have feelings that you would be the better for if you had them. If you were in fault ever, if you had done anything very wrong, I should be sorry for the pain it brought you; I should not want punishment to be heaped on you.

Maggie's protest is an eloquent assertion of the age-old split between thinking and feeling, justice and mercy, that underlies many of the clichés and stereotypes concerning the difference between the sexes. But considered from another point of view, her protest signifies a moment of confrontation, replacing a former evasion. This confrontation reveals two modes of judging, two different constructions of the moral domain—one traditionally associated with masculinity and the public world of social power, the other with femininity and the privacy of domestic interchange. The developmental ordering of these two points of view has been to consider the masculine as more adequate than the feminine and thus as replacing the feminine when the individual moves toward maturity. The reconciliation of these two modes, however, is not clear.

Norma Haan's (1975) research on college students and Constance Holstein's (1976) three-year study of adolescents and their parents indicate that the moral judgments of women differ from those of men in the greater extent to which women's judgments are tied to feelings of empathy and compassion and are concerned with the resolution of real as opposed to hypothetical dilemmas. However, as long as the categories by which development is assessed are derived from research on men, divergence from the masculine stan-

dard can be seen only as a failure of development. As a result, the thinking of women is often classified with that of children. The absence of alternative criteria that might better encompass the development of women, however, points not only to the limitations of theories framed by men and validated by research samples disproportionately male and adolescent, but also to the diffidence prevalent among women, their reluctance to speak publicly in their own voice, given the constraints imposed on them by their lack of power and the politics of relations between the sexes.

In order to go beyond the question, "How much like men do women think, how capable are they of engaging in the abstract and hypothetical construction of reality?" it is necessary to identify and define developmental criteria that encompass the categories of women's thought. Haan points out the necessity to derive such criteria from the resolution of the "more frequently occurring, real-life moral dilemmas of interpersonal, empathic, fellow-feeling concerns" (p. 34) which have long been the center of women's moral concern. But to derive developmental criteria from the language of women's moral discourse, it is necessary first to see whether women's construction of the moral domain relies on a language different from that of men and one that deserves equal credence in the definition of development. This in turn requires finding places where women have the power to choose and thus are willing to speak in their own voice.

When birth control and abortion provide women with effective means for controlling their fertility, the dilemma of choice enters a central arena of women's lives. Then the relationships that have traditionally defined women's identities and framed their moral judgments no longer flow inevitably from their reproductive capacity but become matters of decision over which they have control. Released from the passivity and reticence of a sexuality that binds them in dependence, women can question with Freud what it is that they want and can assert their own answers to that question. However, while society may affirm publicly the woman's right to choose for herself, the exercise of such choice brings her privately into conflict with the conventions of femininity, particularly the moral equation of goodness with self-sacrifice. Among the most important questions in this context is whether a woman's choice to abort is judged as a failure of self-control and concern for others. The conflict between self and other thus constitutes the central

moral problem for women, posing a dilemma whose resolution requires a reconciliation between femininity and adulthood. In the absence of such a reconciliation, the moral problem cannot be resolved. The "good woman" masks assertion in evasion, denying responsibility by claiming only to meet the needs of others, while the "bad woman" forgoes or renounces the commitments that bind her in self-deception and betrayal. It is precisely this dilemma—the conflict between compassion and autonomy, between virtue and power—which the feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effort to reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no one is hurt.

When a woman considers whether to continue or abort a pregnancy, she contemplates a decision that affects both self and others and engages directly the critical moral issue of hurting. Since the choice is ultimately hers and therefore one for which she is responsible, it raises precisely those questions of judgment that have been most problematic for women. Now she is asked whether she wishes to interrupt that stream of life which for centuries has immersed her in the passivity of dependence while at the same time imposing on her the responsibility for care. Thus the abortion decision brings to the core of feminine apprehension, to what Joan Didion (1972) calls "the irreconcilable difference of it—that sense of living one's deepest life underwater, that dark involvement with blood and birth and death" (p. 14), the adult questions of responsibility and choice.

How women deal with such choices was the subject of the abortion study, designed to clarify the ways in which women construct and resolve abortion decisions. Twenty-nine women, ranging in age from fifteen to thirty-three and diverse in ethnic background and social class, were referred for the study by abortion and pregnancy counseling services. The women participated in the study for a variety of reasons—some to gain further clarification with respect to a decision about which they were in conflict, some in response to a counselor's concern about repeated abortions, and others to contribute to ongoing research. Although the pregnancies occurred under a variety of circumstances in the lives of these women, certain commonalities were discerned. The adolescents often failed to use birth control because they denied or discredited their capacity to bear children. Some women became pregnant due to the omission of contraceptive measures in circumstances where intercourse had not been anticipated. Some pregnancies coincided with efforts on the part of the women to end a relationship and may be

seen as a manifestation of ambivalence or as a way of putting the relationship to the ultimate test of commitment. For these women, the pregnancy appeared to be a way of testing truth, making the baby an ally in the search for male support and protection or, that failing, a companion victim of male rejection. Finally, some women became pregnant as a result either of a failure of birth control or of a joint decision that was later reconsidered. Of the twenty-nine women, four decided to have the baby, two miscarried, twenty-one chose abortion, and two who were in doubt about the decision at the time of the interview could not be contacted for the follow-up research.

The women were interviewed twice, first at the time they were making the decision, in the first trimester of a confirmed pregnancy, and then at the end of the following year. The referral procedure required that there be an interval between the woman's contacting a counselor or clinic and the time the abortion was performed. Given this factor and the fact that some counselors saw participation in the study as an effective means of crisis-intervention, there is reason to believe that the women interviewed were in greater than usual conflict over the decision. Since the study focused on the relation between judgment and action rather than on the issue of abortion per se, no effort was made to select a sample that would be representative of women considering, seeking, or having abortions. Thus the findings pertain to the different ways in which women think about dilemmas in their lives rather than to the ways in which women in general think about the abortion choice.

In the initial part of the interview, the women were asked to discuss the decision they faced, how they were dealing with it, the alternatives they were considering, their reasons both for and against each option, the people involved, the conflicts entailed, and the ways in which making this decision affected their views of themselves and their relationships with others. In the second part of the interview, the women were asked to resolve three hypothetical moral dilemmas, including the Heinz dilemma from Kohlberg's research.

In extending Piaget's description of children's moral judgment to the moral judgment of adolescents and adults, Kohlberg (1976) distinguishes three perspectives on moral conflict and choice. Tying moral development in adolescence to the growth of reflective thought at that time, Kohlberg terms these three views of morality

preconventional, conventional, and postconventional, to reflect the expansion in moral understanding from an individual to a societal to a universal point of view. In this scheme, conventional morality, or the equation of the right or good with the maintenance of existing social norms and values, is always the point of departure.

Whereas preconventional moral judgment denotes an inability to construct a shared or societal viewpoint, postconventional judgment transcends that vision. Preconventional judgment is egocentric and derives moral constructs from individual needs; conventional judgment is based on the shared norms and values that sustain relationships, groups, communities, and societies; and postconventional judgment adopts a reflective perspective on societal values and constructs moral principles that are universal in application.

This shift in perspective toward increasingly differentiated, comprehensive, and reflective forms of thought appears in women's responses to both actual and hypothetical dilemmas. But just as the conventions that shape women's moral judgment differ from those that apply to men, so also women's definition of the moral domain diverges from that derived from studies of men. Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception of morality as justice ties development to the logic of equality and reciprocity. Thus the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships, which contrasts with the formal logic of fairness that informs the justice approach.

Women's constructions of the abortion dilemma in particular reveal the existence of a distinct moral language whose evolution traces a sequence of development. This is the language of selfishness and responsibility, which defines the moral problem as one of obligation to exercise care and avoid hurt. The inflicting of hurt is considered selfish and immoral in its reflection of unconcern, while the expression of care is seen as the fulfillment of moral responsibility. The reiterative use by the women of the words *selfish* and *responsible* in talking about moral conflict and choice, given the underlying moral orientation that this language reflects, sets the women apart from the men whom Kohlberg studied and points toward a different understanding of moral development.

The three moral perspectives revealed by the abortion decision

study denote a sequence in the development of the ethic of care. These different views of care and the transitions between them emerged from an analysis of the ways in which the women used moral language—words such as *should*, *ought*, *better*, *right*, *good*, and *bad*, by the changes and shifts that appeared in their thinking, and by the way in which they reflected on and judged their thought. In this sequence, an initial focus on caring for the self in order to ensure survival is followed by a transitional phase in which this judgment is criticized as selfish. The criticism signals a new understanding of the connection between self and others which is articulated by the concept of responsibility. The elaboration of this concept of responsibility and its fusion with a maternal morality that seeks to ensure care for the dependent and unequal characterizes the second perspective. At this point, the good is equated with caring for others. However, when only others are legitimized as the recipients of the woman's care, the exclusion of herself gives rise to problems in relationships, creating a disequilibrium that initiates the second transition. The equation of conformity with care, in its conventional definition, and the illogic of the inequality between other and self, lead to a reconsideration of relationships in an effort to sort out the confusion between self-sacrifice and care inherent in the conventions of feminine goodness. The third perspective focuses on the dynamics of relationships and dissipates the tension between selfishness and responsibility through a new understanding of the interconnection between other and self. Care becomes the self-chosen principle of a judgment that remains psychological in its concern with relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation and hurt. Thus a progressively more adequate understanding of the psychology of human relationships—an increasing differentiation of self and other and a growing comprehension of the dynamics of social interaction—informs the development of an ethic of care. This ethic, which reflects a cumulative knowledge of human relationships, evolves around a central insight, that self and other are interdependent. The different ways of thinking about this connection or the different modes of its apprehension mark the three perspectives and their transitional phases. In this sequence, the fact of interconnection informs the central, recurring recognition that just as the incidence of violence is in the end destructive to all, so the activity of care enhances both others and self.

In its simplest construction, the abortion decision centers on

the self. The concern is pragmatic and the issue is survival. The woman focuses on taking care of herself because she feels that she is all alone. From this perspective, *should* is undifferentiated from *would*, and other people influence the decision only through their power to affect its consequences. Susan, an eighteen-year-old, asked what she thought when she found herself pregnant, replies: "I really didn't think anything except that I didn't want it. (*Why was that?*) I didn't want it, I wasn't ready for it, and next year will be my last year and I want to go to school." Asked if there is a right decision or a right way to decide about abortion, she says: "There is no right decision. (*Why?*) I didn't want it." For her, the question of rightness would emerge only if her own needs were in conflict; then she would have to decide which needs should take precedence. This is the dilemma of Joan, another eighteen-year-old, who sees having a baby not only as a way of increasing her freedom by providing "the perfect chance to get married and move away from home," but also as restricting her freedom "to do a lot of things."

In this mode of understanding, the self, which is the sole object of concern, is constrained by a lack of power that stems from feeling disconnected and thus, in effect, all alone. The wish "to do a lot of things" is constantly belied by the limitations of what has in fact been done. Relationships are for the most part disappointing. "The only thing you are ever going to get out of going with a guy is to get hurt." As a result, women in some instances deliberately choose isolation to protect themselves against hurt. When asked how she would describe herself, Martha, a nineteen-year-old who holds herself responsible for the accidental death of a younger brother to whom she felt particularly close, answers:

I really don't know. I never thought about it. I don't know. I know basically the outline of a character. I am very independent. I don't really want to have to ask anybody for anything, and I am a loner in life. I prefer to be by myself than around anybody else. I manage to keep my friends at a limited number to the point that I have very few friends. I don't know what else there is. I am a loner, and I enjoy it. Here today and gone tomorrow.

The primacy of the concern with survival is explicitly acknowledged by Betty, a sixteen-year-old, in her judgment of Heinz's dilemma about stealing a drug to save the life of his wife:

I think survival is one of the first things in life that people fight for. I think it is the most important thing, more important than stealing. Stealing might be wrong, but if you have to steal to survive yourself or even kill, that is what you should do . . . Preservation of oneself, I think, is the most important thing. It comes before anything in life.

In the transition that follows this position, the concepts of selfishness and responsibility first appear. Their reference initially is to the self, in a redefinition of the self-interest that has so far served as the basis for judgment. The transitional issue is one of attachment or connection to others. The pregnancy highlights this issue not only by representing an immediate, literal connection but also by affirming, in the most concrete and physical way, the capacity to assume adult feminine roles. Although having a baby at first seems to offer respite from the loneliness of adolescence and to solve conflicts over dependence and independence, in reality the continuation of an adolescent pregnancy generally compounds these problems, increasing social isolation and precluding further steps toward independence.

To be a mother in the societal as well as the physical sense requires the assumption of parental responsibility for the care and protection of a child. However, in order to be able to care for another, one must first be able to care responsibly for oneself. The growth from childhood to adulthood, conceived as a move from selfishness to responsibility, is articulated by Josie, a seventeen-year-old, in describing her response to pregnancy:

I started feeling really good about being pregnant instead of feeling really bad, because I wasn't looking at the situation realistically. I was looking at it from my own sort of selfish needs, because I was lonely. Things weren't really going good for me, so I was looking at it that I could have a baby that I could take care of or something that was part of me, and that made me feel good. But I wasn't looking at the realistic side, at the responsibility I would have to take on. I came to this decision that I was going to have an abortion because I realized how much responsibility goes with having a child. Like you have to be there; you can't be out of the house all the time, which is one thing I like to do. And I decided that I

have to take on responsibility for myself and I have to work out a lot of things.

Describing her former mode of judgment, the wish to have a baby as a way of combating loneliness and making connection, Josie now criticizes that judgment as both "selfish" and "unrealistic." The contradiction between the wish for a baby and the wish for freedom to be "out of the house all the time"—that is, between connection and independence—is resolved in terms of a new priority. As the criterion for judgment shifts, the dilemma assumes a moral dimension, and the conflict between wish and necessity is cast as a disparity between "would" and "should." In this construction the "selfishness" of willful decision is counterposed to the "responsibility" of moral choice:

What I want to do is to have the baby, but what I feel I should do, which is what I need to do, is have an abortion right now, because sometimes what you want isn't right. Sometimes what is necessary comes before what you want, because it might not always lead to the right thing.

Pregnancy itself confirms femininity, as Josie says: "I started feeling really good. Being pregnant, I started feeling like a woman." But the abortion decision becomes for her an opportunity for the adult exercise of responsible choice:

(*How would you describe yourself to yourself?*) I am looking at myself differently in the way that I have had a really heavy decision put upon me, and I have never really had too many hard decisions in my life, and I have made it. It has taken some responsibility to do this. I have changed in that way, that I have made a hard decision. And that has been good. Because before, I would not have looked at it realistically, in my opinion. I would have gone by what I wanted to do, and I wanted it, and even if it wasn't right. So I see myself as becoming more mature in ways of making decisions and taking care of myself, doing something for myself. I think it is going to help me in other ways, if I have other decisions to make put upon me, which would take some responsibility. And I would know that I could make them.

In the epiphany of this cognitive reconstruction, the old becomes transformed in the new. The wish to "do something for myself" remains, but the terms of its fulfillment change. For Josie, the abortion decision affirms both femininity and adulthood in its integration of care and responsibility. Morality, says another adolescent, "is the way you think about yourself. Sooner or later you have to make up your mind to start taking care of yourself. Abortion, if you do it for the right reasons, is helping yourself to start over and do different things."

Since this transition signals an enhancement in self-worth, it requires a conception of self that includes the possibility for doing "the right thing," the ability to see in oneself the potential for being good and therefore worthy of social inclusion. When such confidence is seriously in doubt, the transitional issues may be raised, but development is impeded. The failure to make this first transition, despite an understanding of the issues involved, is illustrated by Anne, who in her late twenties struggles with the conflict between selfishness and responsibility but fails to resolve her dilemma of whether or not to have a third abortion:

I think you have to think about the people who are involved, including yourself. You have responsibilities to yourself. And to make a right—whatever that is—decision in this depends on your knowledge and awareness of the responsibilities that you have and whether you can survive with a child and what it will do to your relationship with the father or how it will affect him emotionally.

Rejecting the idea of selling the baby and making "a lot of money in a black market kind of thing . . . because mostly I operate on principles, and it would just rub me the wrong way to think I would be selling my own child," Anne struggles with a concept of responsibility which repeatedly turns back on the question of her own survival. Transition seems blocked by a self-image that is insistently contradictory:

(How would you describe yourself to yourself?) I see myself as impulsive, practical—that is a contradiction—and moral and amoral, a contradiction. Actually the only thing that is consistent and not contradictory is the fact that I am very lazy, which everyone has always told me is really a symptom of

something else which I have never been able to put my finger on exactly. It has taken me a long time to like myself. In fact, there are times when I don't, which I think is healthy to a point, and sometimes I think I like myself too much, and I probably evade myself too much, which avoids responsibility to myself and to other people who like me. I am pretty unfaithful to myself. I have a hard time even thinking that I am a human being, simply because so much rotten stuff goes on and people are so crummy and insensitive.

Seeing herself as avoiding responsibility, she can find no basis upon which to resolve the pregnancy dilemma. Her inability to arrive at any clear sense of decision only contributes further to her overall sense of failure. Criticizing her parents for having betrayed her during adolescence by coercing her into having an abortion she did not want, she now betrays herself and criticizes that as well. In this light, it is not surprising that she considers selling her child, since she feels herself to have, in effect, been sold by her parents for the sake of maintaining their reputation.

The transition from the first to the second perspective, the shift from selfishness to responsibility, is a move toward social participation. Whereas from the first perspective, morality is a matter of sanctions imposed by a society of which one is more subject than citizen, from the second perspective, moral judgment relies on shared norms and expectations. The woman at this point validates her claim to social membership through the adoption of societal values. Consensual judgment about goodness becomes the overriding concern as survival is now seen to depend on acceptance by others.

Here the conventional feminine voice emerges with great clarity, defining the self and proclaiming its worth on the basis of the ability to care for and protect others. The woman now constructs a world perused with the assumptions about feminine goodness that are reflected in the stereotypes of the Broverman et al. studies (1972), where all the attributes considered desirable for women presume an other—the recipient of the "tact, gentleness and easy expression of feeling" which allow the woman to respond sensitively while evoking in return the care that meets her "very strong need for security" (p. 63). The strength of this position lies in its capacity for caring; the limitation of this position lies in the restriction it imposes on direct expression. Both qualities are elucidated by

Judy, a nineteen-year-old who contrasts her own reluctance to criticize with her boyfriend's straightforwardness:

I never want to hurt anyone, and I tell them in a very nice way, and I have respect for their own opinions, and they can do things the way that they want. He usually tells people right off the bat. He does a lot of things out in public which I do in private. It is better, but I just could never do it.

While her judgment clearly exists, it is not expressed, at least not in public. Concern for the feelings of others imposes a deference to them which she nevertheless criticizes in her awareness that, under the name of consideration, a vulnerability and a duplicity are concealed.

At this point in development, conflict arises specifically over the issue of hurting. When no option exists that can be construed as being in the best interest of everybody, when responsibilities conflict and decision entails the sacrifice of somebody's needs, then the woman confronts the seemingly impossible task of choosing the victim. Cathy, a nineteen-year-old, fearing the consequences for herself of a second abortion, but facing opposition from both her family and her lover to the continuation of the pregnancy, describes the dilemma:

I don't know what choices are open to me. It is either to have it or the abortion; these are the choices open to me. I think what confuses me is it is a choice of either hurting myself or hurting other people around me. What is more important? If there could be a happy medium, it would be fine, but there isn't. It is either hurting someone on this side or hurting myself.

Although the feminine identification of goodness with self-sacrifice clearly dictates the "right" resolution of this dilemma, the stakes may be high for the woman herself, and in any event the sacrifice of the fetus compromises the altruism of an abortion motivated by concern for others. Since femininity itself is in conflict in an abortion intended as an expression of love and care, this resolution readily explodes in its own contradiction.

"I don't think anyone should have to choose between two things that they love," says Denise, a twenty-five-year-old who had

an abortion she did not want because she felt a responsibility not only for her lover but also for his wife and children:

I just wanted the child, and I really don't believe in abortions. Who can say when life begins? I think that life begins at conception. I felt like there were changes happening in my body, and I felt very protective. But I felt a responsibility, my responsibility if anything ever happened to [his wife]. He made me feel that I had to make a choice and there was only one choice to make and that was to have an abortion and I could always have children another time, and he made me feel if I didn't have it that it would drive us apart.

The abortion decision was in her mind a choice not to choose with respect to the pregnancy: "That was my choice: I had to do it." Instead, she chose to subordinate the pregnancy to the continuation of a relationship that she saw as encompassing her life:

"Since I met him, he has been my life. I do everything for him; my life sort of revolves around him." Since she wanted to have the baby and also wanted to continue the relationship, either choice could be construed as selfish. Furthermore, since both alternatives entailed hurting someone, neither could be considered moral. Faced with a decision which, in her own terms, was untenable, she sought to avoid responsibility for the choice she made, construing the decision as a sacrifice of her own needs to those of her lover and his wife. However, this public sacrifice in the name of responsibility engendered a private resentment that erupted in anger, compromising the very relationship it was intended to sustain:

Afterwards we went through a bad time because—I hate to say it and I was wrong—but I blamed him. I gave in to him. But when it came down to it, I made the decision. I could have said, "I am going to have this child, whether you want me to or not," and I just didn't do it.

Pregnant again by the same man, she recognizes in retrospect that the choice was in fact hers, as she returns once again to what now appears to have been a missed opportunity for growth. Seeking this time to make rather than abdicate the decision, she sees the issue as one of "strength," and she struggles to free herself from the powerlessness of her own dependence:

Right now I think of myself as someone who can become a lot stronger. Because of the circumstances, I just go along with the tide. I never really had anything of my own before . . . I hope to come on strong and make a big decision, whether it is right or wrong.

Because the morality of self-sacrifice justified the previous abortion, she now must suspend that judgment if she is to claim her own voice and accept responsibility for choice. She thereby calls into question the assumption underlying her former perspective, that she is responsible for the actions of others while others are responsible for the choices she makes. This notion of responsibility, backwards in its assumptions about control, disguises assertion as response. By reversing responsibility, it generates a series of indirect actions, which in the end leave everyone feeling manipulated and betrayed. The logic of this position is confused in that the morality of mutual care is embedded in the psychology of dependence. Assertion becomes potentially immoral in its power to hurt. This confusion is captured in Kohlberg's definition of the third stage of moral development which joins the need for approval with the wish to care for and help others. When thus caught between the passivity of dependence and the activity of care, the woman becomes suspended in a paralysis of initiative with respect to both action and thought. Thus Denise speaks of herself as "just going along with the tide."

The transitional phase that follows this judgment is marked by a shift in concern from goodness to truth. The transition begins with reconsideration of the relationship between self and other, as the woman starts to scrutinize the logic of self-sacrifice in the service of a morality of care. In the abortion interviews this transition is announced by the reappearance of the word *selfish*. Retrieving the judgmental initiative, the woman begins to ask whether it is selfish or responsible, moral or immoral, to include her own needs within the compass of her care and concern. This question leads her to reexamine the concept of responsibility, juxtaposing the concern with what other people think with a new inner judgment.

In separating the voice of the self from the voices of others, the woman asks if it is possible to be responsible to herself as well as to others and thus to reconcile the disparity between hurt and care. The exercise of such responsibility requires a new kind of

judgment, whose first demand is for honesty. To be responsible for oneself, it is first necessary to acknowledge what one is doing. The criterion for judgment thus shifts from goodness to truth when the morality of action is assessed not on the basis of its appearance in the eyes of others, but in terms of the realities of its intention and consequence.

Janet, a twenty-four-year-old married Catholic, pregnant again two months following the birth of her first child, identifies her dilemma as one of choice: "You have to decide now. Because abortion is now available, you have to make a decision. And if it weren't available, there would be no choice open; you just do what you have to do." In the absence of legal abortion, a morality of self-sacrifice is necessary in order to ensure protection and care for the dependent child. However, when such sacrifice becomes optional, the entire problem is recast.

The abortion decision is framed by Janet first in terms of her responsibilities to others, since having a second child at this time would be contrary to medical advice and would strain both the emotional and financial resources of the family. However, there is, she says, another reason for having an abortion, "sort of an emotional reason. I don't know if it is selfish or not, but it would really be tying myself down, and right now I am not ready to be tied down with two."

Against this combination of selfish and responsible reasons for abortion is her religious belief about abortion:

It is taking a life. Even though it is not formed, it is the potential, and to me it is still taking a life. But I have to think of mine, my son's, and my husband's. And at first I thought it was for selfish reasons, but it is not. I believe that, too, some of it is selfish. I don't want another one right now; I am not ready for it."

The dilemma arises over the issue of justification for taking a life. "I can't cover it over, because I believe this, and if I do try to cover it over, I know that I am going to be in a mess. It will be denying what I am really doing." Asking herself, "Am I doing the right thing: is it moral?" Janet counterposes her beliefs about abortion to her concern with the consequences of continuing the pregnancy. Concluding that she cannot be "so morally strict as to hurt three

other people with a decision just because of my moral beliefs," she finds that the issue of goodness still remains critical to her resolution of the dilemma:

The moral factor is there. To me it is taking a life, and I am going to take that decision upon myself, and I have feelings about it, and talked to a priest. But he said it is there, and it will be from now on, and it is up to the person if they can live with the idea and still believe they are good.

The criteria for goodness, however, move inward since the ability to have an abortion and still consider herself good hinges on the issue of selfishness. Asked if acting morally is acting according to what is best for the self or whether it is a matter of self-sacrifice, she replies:

I don't know if I really understand the question. In my situation, where I want to have the abortion, and if I didn't it would be self-sacrificing, I am really in the middle of both those ways. But I think that my morality is strong, and if these reasons—financial, physical reality, and also for the whole family involved—were not here, that I wouldn't have to do it, and then it would be a self-sacrifice.

The importance of clarifying her own participation in the decision is evident in her attempt to ascertain her feelings in order to determine whether or not she is "putting them under" in deciding to end the pregnancy. In the first transition, from selfishness to responsibility, women make lists in order to bring to their consideration needs other than their own. But in the second transition, from goodness to truth, the needs of the self have to be deliberately uncovered. Confronting the reality of her own wish for an abortion, Janet deals with the problem of selfishness and the qualification that it seems to impose on the "goodness" of her decision. But the concern with selfishness yields in the end to a concern with honesty and truth:

I think in a way I am selfish, and very emotional, and I think that I am a very real person and an understanding person, and I can handle life situations fairly well, so I am basing a lot of it on my ability to do the things that I feel are right and best

for me and whomever I am involved with. I think I was very fair to myself about the decision, and I really think that I have been truthful, not hiding anything, bringing out all the feelings involved. I feel it is a good decision and an honest one, a real decision.

Thus she strives to encompass the needs of both self and others, to be responsible to others and thus to be "good" but also to be responsible to herself and thus to be "honest" and "real."

Although from one point of view, paying attention to one's own needs is selfish, from a different perspective it is not only honest but fair. This is the essence of the transitional shift toward a new concept of goodness, which turns inward in acknowledging the self and in accepting responsibility for choice. Outward justification, the concern with "good reasons," remains critical for Janet: "I still think abortion is wrong, and it will be unless the situation can justify what you are doing." However, the search for justification produces a change in her thinking, "not drastically, but a little bit." She realizes that in continuing the pregnancy, she would punish not only herself but also her husband, toward whom she has begun to feel "turned off and irritated." This leads her to consider the possible consequences of self-sacrifice both for the self and for others. At the end, Janet says, "God can punish, but He can also forgive." What remains in question for her is whether her claim to forgiveness is compromised by a decision that not only meets the needs of others but also is "right and best for me."

The concern with selfishness and its equation with immorality recur in an interview with Sandra, a twenty-nine-year-old Catholic nurse, who punctuates her arrival for an abortion with the statement, "I have always thought abortion was a fancy word for murder." Initially she explains this murder as one of lesser degree, because "I am doing it because I have to do it. I am not doing it the least bit because I want to." Thus, she judges it "not quite as bad. You can rationalize that it is not quite the same." Since "keeping the child for lots and lots of reasons was just sort of impractical and out," she considers her options to be either abortion or adoption. Having previously given up one child for adoption, she finds that "psychologically there was no way that I could hack another adoption. It took me about four and a half years to get my head on straight. There was just no way I was going to go through it again." The decision thus reduces in her eyes to a choice between mur-

dering the fetus or damaging herself. The choice is further complicated by the fact that to continue the pregnancy would hurt not only herself but also her parents, with whom she lives. In the face of these manifold moral contradictions, the psychological honesty demanded in counseling finally allows her to reach a decision:

On my own, I was doing it not so much for myself; I was doing it for my parents. I was doing it because the doctor told me to do it, but I had never resolved in my mind that I was doing it for me. Actually, I had to sit down and admit, "No, I really don't want to go the mother route now. I honestly don't feel that I want to be a mother." And that is not really such a bad thing to say after all. But that is not how I felt up until talking to [her counselor]. It was just a horrible way to feel, so I just wasn't going to feel it, and I just blocked it right out.

As long as her consideration remains "moral," abortion can be justified only as an act of sacrifice, a submission to necessity where the absence of choice precludes responsibility. In this way, she can avoid self-condemnation, since, "When you get into moral stuff, then you are getting into self-respect, and if I do something that I feel is morally wrong, then I tend to lose some of my self-respect as a person." Her evasion of responsibility, critical to maintaining the innocence she considers necessary for self-respect, contradicts the reality of her participation in the abortion decision. The dishonesty in her plea of victimization creates a conflict that generates the need for a more inclusive understanding. She must now resolve the emerging contradiction in her thinking between her two uses of the terms *right* and *wrong*: "I am saying that abortion is morally wrong, but the situation is right, and I am going to do it. But the thing is that eventually they are going to have to go together, and I am going to have to put them together somehow." Asked how this could be done, she replies:

I would have to change morally wrong to morally right. (How?) I have no idea. I don't think you can take something that you feel is morally wrong because the situation makes it right and put the two together. They are not together, they are opposite. They don't go together. Something is wrong, but all of a sudden, because you are doing it, it is right.

This discrepancy recalls a similar conflict she faced over the question of euthanasia, which she also considered morally wrong until she was responsible for the care of "a couple of patients who had flat EEGs and saw the job that it was doing on their families." That experience led her to realize:

You really don't know your black and whites until you really get into them and are being confronted with it. If you stop and think about my feelings on euthanasia until I got into it, and then my feelings about abortion until I got into it, I thought both of them were murder. Right and wrong and no middle, but there is a gray.

In discovering the gray and questioning the moral judgments that formerly she considered absolute, she confronts the moral crisis of the second transition. Now the conventions which in the past guided her moral judgment become subject to a new criticism, as she questions not only the justification for hurting others in the name of morality but also the "rightness" of hurting herself. However, to sustain such criticism in the face of conventions that equate goodness with self-sacrifice, Sandra must verify her capacity for independent judgment and the legitimacy of her own point of view.

Once again transition hinges on self-concept. When uncertainty about her own worth prevents a woman from claiming equality, self-assertion falls prey to the old criticism of selfishness. Then the morality that condones self-destruction in the name of responsible care is not repudiated as inadequate but is rather abandoned in the face of its threat to survival. Moral obligation, rather than expanding to include the self, is rejected completely when the failure of response leaves the woman unwilling any longer to protect others at what is now seen to be her own expense. In the absence of morality, survival, however "selfish" or "immoral," returns as the paramount concern.

Ellen, a musician in her late twenties, illustrates this transitional impasse. Having led an independent life that centered on her work, she considered herself "fairly strong-willed, fairly in control, fairly rational and objective," until she became involved in an intense love affair and discovered in her capacity to love an "entirely new dimension" in herself. Admitting in retrospect to "tremendous naiveté and idealism," she had entertained "vague ideas that some

opmental levels of thinking found in a previous study of these journals (Bardige, 1983) are described. The present study identifies a particular response to violence found almost exclusively in the journals of girls whose entries were coded as exhibiting some thinking at the lowest of these developmental levels. It reveals the moral strength of this response through contrast with similar, developmentally more sophisticated responses, and examines transformations of this response in one student's journal as well as in a class discussion. The article, thus, illustrates ways in which education can sustain or erode moral sensibilities across a developmental transition that educators frequently encourage.

In pointing to moral sensibilities that may become muted as language becomes more abstract, I do not intend to deny the potential for abstract thinking to also expand moral awareness and inform moral judgment. Similarly, the use of categories derived from cognitive developmental theory should not be read as simply an attempt to rank the moral adequacy of students' responses. This article points out the moral strengths (as well as limitations) of moral language which has been called simplistic, naive, or low stage.*

This article challenges two different views of moral development that are prevalent in both psychological and popular literature: the image of the wise child who sees and speaks the truth until he or she is corrupted by civilization or education, and the image of a ladder comprised of a progression of moral stages leading finally, to the use of universal ethical principles. These oppositely charted developmental courses intersect in adolescence, when, in both views, the discovery of evil undermines previous loyalties and beliefs.

In exploring this intersection--through the writings of young adolescents who are confronting evil--the larger study (Bardige, 1983) on which this article is based demonstrated how adolescents' moral intensity can be engaged by a Holocaust course which raises moral issues in their minds and takes their moral questions seriously. Bringing together emotional/empathetic responses and reflective thinking, this kind of education may sustain moral sensibilities that are "at risk" as formal reasoning develops, even as it expands moral awareness.

Facing History provided the context in which the phenomenon of moral sensibilities at risk was observed. There is no attempt to evaluate

this course here. Rather, the aim is to provide an understanding of how early adolescents' cognitive and moral discoveries can lead them to lose sight of or doubt important childhood sensibilities. This understanding can inform educational efforts.

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The study began as an attempt to observe the effects of a course that would stimulate moral thinking and moral development in adolescence. The course, *Facing History and Ourselves* (Strom & Parsons, 1982), is an eight to ten-week unit that challenges adolescents to explore their own moral options and responsibilities. It presents material on the Holocaust and also the Armenian genocide, in a context that highlights the choices that people made and encourages students to "face history and themselves." This course was designed by Margot Stern Strom and William Parsons, two Brookline, Massachusetts teachers. Strom and Parsons felt that it was important for their eighth-grade students to know about the Holocaust. They also believed that thinking about these periods of history could lead students to new understandings of themselves and increased moral commitment.

Facing History has been cited twice by the U.S. Department of Education as an outstanding and effective program (Far West Laboratory for Educational Research and Development, 1981, 1986), based on studies by Lieberman (1978, 1986¹) of its role in promoting development in interpersonal perspective taking.

Extensive descriptive and anecdotal data collected by the project (Strom, 1977;² Strom & Parsons, 1983; Johnson & Strom, 1985) reveal that students and teachers see the course as raising vital moral questions and enlarging their moral thinking. Students from many different settings testify that the course was a high point in their education (Whitner, 1981;³ Intersection Associates, 1986⁴).

In their rationale for the course, Strom and Parsons (1982, p. 13) quote Hannah Arendt (1972). "Could the activity of thinking, as such . . . be among the conditions that make men abstain from evil doing or even actually conditions them against it?" Strom and Parsons go on to say, "If we are to meet our present problems in human and creative ways, it is

Teachers of *Facing History* in many different settings report that their students "tunger" for material that makes them think in the way Arendt proposes. Despite the reservations of many who would "protect" young adolescents from the awful truths of the Holocaust, eighth graders say they are ready to face it, and their teachers agree (Colt, Paine, & Connolly, 1981).

One requirement of *Facing History* is that each student keep a journal. Students are asked to write a response to each class, giving personal feelings, observations, opinions, and questions about what was seen or discussed and its significance. Thus, the journal provides a space and a structure for "facing history" and "facing one's self."

The journal is also a personal channel of communication between the student and the teacher. Students share their reactions to the class and their struggles with painful material. They ask questions that are difficult to voice in class and request emotional and intellectual support. A teacher's response can stimulate and complicate students' thinking, support their struggle, and honor their caring and their developing ideals.

The journals analyzed for this study came primarily from two eighth-grade classes taught in suburban public schools. The first class consisted of eight boys and eight girls and was taught in 1978. The second class, taught in 1979, contained sixteen girls and nine boys; however, three of the boys had sufficient difficulty with writing that they were unable to keep journals. Five additional boys' journals were obtained from a combined seventh and eighth-grade class at another suburban school.

The original intent of the study had been to elaborate Piagetian development categories and to follow the transition from one to the next in students' understandings of psychology, epistemology, history, and morality. This focus assumed that, as a developmental curriculum, *Facing History* would foster "development." The intention was to describe students' thinking in a way that would be helpful in understanding how they were interpreting the course material, in recognizing their questions, in appreciating their moral responses, and in documenting their expanding awareness. The descriptive categories are called "developmental" because they grew out of an attempt to bring a Piagetian interpretive framework to the journal data. No independent developmental assessments were used.

A pilot study by the author (1981) provided a foundation for the cognitive-developmental analysis of students' journals. Building on the work of Imhelder and Piaget (1958), Kohlberg (1981), Selman (1980), and Kegan (1982), journal responses to three films that are central to the course were analyzed in terms of complexity of perspective-taking. This analysis provided a basis for constructing integrated developmental descriptions that explain the understandings of epistemology, psychology, and history; the sense of morality; and questions that are expressed in students' journals. In constructing these ideal types, the various domains were assumed to be "structures d'ensemble," with ideas about history and morality grounded in understandings of epistemology and psychology.

DEVELOPMENTAL ANALYSIS OF JOURNAL ENTRIES

Students' responses reflected three ways of seeing the material, analogous to Piaget's stages of concrete operational, emerging formal operational, and fully formal operational thinking. Some entries took what was presented at face value, recounting salient details without analysis, inferring motives, feelings, and character traits directly from actions without considering alternative possibilities, and taking accounts literally. These characterizations were one-dimensional and often evaluative; changes were portrayed as having single causes. This way of thinking, which would in Piagetian terms be called concrete, can also be called *face value thinking*. In other entries students drew composite pictures, putting pieces together into a whole story that would include "both sides," and looking below the surface to understand the thinking and motivations of the people involved. This way of thinking, which has many of the characteristics of Piaget's stage of early formal thinking, can be called *composite picture thinking*. Other responses revealed that students were using multiple lenses, considering situations from several points of view and recognizing that what people see is affected not only by where they stand but also by the language and values through which they filter their perceptions. This way of thinking reveals capacities that Piaget associates with fully formal thinking and can be called *multiple lens thinking*. Two modes of thinking (face value and composite picture, or composite picture and multiple lens) were often represented in a single student's journal sometimes in the same

As the developmental analysis of journals progressed, it became clear that most students' thinking was changing during the course. Some of the changes seemed to be developmental shifts--students whose writing had been characterized at one level began using statements revealing characteristics of the next level; students whose thinking in one domain had seemed to lag behind their thinking in other domains developed insights consonant with their 'more advanced' thinking. However, the most striking changes, and those reported most often by students in their own assessments of what they had learned, were of a different nature. Rather than showing cognitive advance or restructuring, they reflected what one student called 'a sort of emmoralment,' an enhancement of moral awareness and a new commitment to moral action.

Now I shudder whenever I hear . . . [a] prejudiced statement. That's what this course did for me.

I think more carefully about the decisions I make. That each one be the best morally.

I don't get as depressed as I used to . . . when I do get depressed it's usually over someone else's troubles.

I've learned that, besides all the bad, there is a lot of good in the world.

Students report becoming more sensitive, more reflective, and less hasty in their judgments. They find that they are more aware of others' problems and of the consequences of their own actions or inaction. Many become attuned to the evils in their world--prejudice, deception, lack of care, and violence. Many also learn to recognize the good; they express appreciation of what they have been given and see what they can contribute. Their *Facing History* journals capture the kind of response Terrence Des Pres (1976⁴) observed when he taught young people about the Holocaust:

And for all their shock and depression and yes, also their tears, what emerges finally are things so finely human, things so clearly good and life-enhancing, that the danger we run and the damage we share in meditation on the Holocaust seem not too high a price to pay.

As students reflected in their journals on material that engaged their empathy and moral outrage or that challenged their theories about history and human nature and their sense of themselves as moral, as they saw the

difference, the 'finely human' aspects of their thinking were revealed and strengthened. New descriptions of moral thinking were needed to encompass these finely human aspects.

These descriptions departed from the work of structural developmental theorists (Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg, 1976; Loewinger, 1976; Damon, 1977; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979; Selman, 1980; Kegan, 1982) by breaking the link that their theories posit between cognitive and moral adequacy. The moral strengths evident in the journals of young adolescents who were facing history and themselves were not reflected in the theoretical descriptions of moral thinking that corresponded to their cognitive levels and thus, this incongruity lead to a shift in the focus of the research.

Face Value Morality

The limitations of existing frameworks were clearest at the concrete operational level. The profoundly moral sense of justice and concern for others expressed in journal entries that were identified as face value responses is not reflected in structural developmental characterizations of this stage. Kohlberg's 'stage of instrumental purpose and exchange' (1981), Kegan's 'imperial self' (1982), and Loewinger's 'self-protective ego' or 'opportunistic stage' (1976) all portray a more self-centered individual than these students' journals reveal. In reacting to things that they see as clearly and obviously wrong, these students reveal a profound sense of morality that may not be exhibited when they are asked to solve hypothetical dilemmas or to complete sentences.

The moral strengths and altruistic potentials of face value thinking are evident in Angela's journal. Her first entry is a response to 'Harrison Bergeron,' Kurt Vonnegut's satiric account of a society which handicaps those with special talent so that all can be equal. The teacher used this story to raise issues about the relationship of the individual and society, but Angela took it literally.

When we were reading that story I felt kind of angry. I wanted to get revenge on Diana [the Handicapper General] for having people have handicaps on themselves. I got a mental picture of everybody who had to wear those beavers [to prevent thinking] walking around with ear plugs with batteries in them and an antenna on each one. The ballerinas with weights on their feet, I picture them having heavy balls of iron chained to their feet, like people in the old prisons.

Angela's comments highlight the physical pains and tangible losses of the victims. She is outraged that people were hurt and hampered for no good reason. She wants revenge on the person she sees as the cause of others' suffering.

Angela's morality, like that expressed by others who take accounts at face value, demands fairness. You must not hurt "without giving them a chance" or "for no good reason." However, it is fair to hurt those who have hurt or are about to hurt others. Life is supposed to be fair, rewarding the good and punishing the bad.

This formulation incorporates the "concrete reciprocity" that characterizes Kohlberg's Stage 2. However, Kohlberg's description of this stage emphasizes self-interest: right action "instrumentally satisfies the self's needs and occasionally others" (1969, p. 379). In the journals, however, one can often see the altruistic potentials and moral power of concrete reciprocity. Angela wrote:

I was really touched by the film we saw today. It was really sad and disappointing. It was disappointing to think that human beings could treat other human beings that way. You could almost call the Germans of that time animals, anyway. And the people who wouldn't take those kids in for a while and give them food, they were mean, too. The children could have worked for them for a day for the food and lodging.

Angela proposes a fair exchange--work for food and lodging. Not looking at the fears or beliefs of those who turn away from a request for help, she sees them as "mean" because they will not even make a fair deal. Thus, although Angela recognizes self-interest as legitimate by not requiring people to help others for free, she expects people to be nice to each other and to help those in need.

Students who take accounts at face value respond with indignation, anger, and even hatred to those who grossly overstep the natural bounds of self-interest. They are seen as "insane" or as "greedy" and "power hungry." Similarly, those who take the film *Joseph Schultz* at face value consistently applaud the actions of this German soldier who was shot by his unit because he refused to shoot unarmed men. They see his action as "brave," "great," and "a good thing to do."

The "finely human" potentials of students who responded at face value were evident in their journals. They readily empathized with those who were hurt and found it painful to learn what others had suffered. "I was

struck deep down by this. It hurt to hear what suffering those people went through." These students reacted to much of the course with outrage and puzzlement: "How could the rest of the world let this go on? It's disgusting!"

Their concern for others sometimes led them to stereotype groups portrayed as victimizers, but they tended to see prejudice against an individual as unfair. These students could become so angry at the small and large injustices they saw that they wanted to stop them immediately (even violently) or take revenge. When they saw another's suffering they wanted to help "because we should do something for those people." Often the immediacy of their perceptions, the passionate clarity of their judgments, the intensity of their involvement, and their eagerness to "do something" were striking.

Composite Picture Morality

Composite pictures treat accounts as parts of larger wholes. Students read between the lines, search for underlying motives and explanations, try to "see both sides," and conjoin different and sometimes conflicting parts to arrive at the "whole truth." People are seen as mixtures of good and bad "sides" and of different capacities. Their "real personality" can be inferred from the pattern of their actions; however, it may be dominated, at least temporarily, by various kinds of "pressure to go against your real self." Thus, actions can only be understood in context, considering how the person perceived the situation, the pressures he faced, and his psychological as well as physical needs.

Students no longer assume that they can put themselves easily in others' places; however, they can build on their own experiences to empathize with others. "I fasted for Oxfam [an international hunger relief organization] last year and after one day I was about to die. Imagine how it must feel not eating for weeks." They can be simultaneously critical and supportive. "I would be paranoid too but I would still try to keep an open [unprejudiced] mind."

Their search for the whole truth is often coupled with a faith in human nature that leads them to be generous in their judgments. They want to hear all sides, "learn the minds" of the people involved, find and appeal to the

good in individuals and societies. "It makes me glad to know that all the Turks weren't bad people."

Students who draw composite pictures present a morality that demands recognition of people and consideration of their perspectives. People are expected to try to put themselves in others' shoes, to realize that "people are people," and to look at both sides. "All I could think about was these important people being . . . killed just because of what they believed." These students can also realize how difficult it is, in many real situations, to do what you know you should. Life presents a series of moral tests; it is not always easy to "stand up for your beliefs," but you feel "small" when you don't.

Multiple Lens Morality

Multiple lens users can construct systems in which the whole is more than the sum of the parts. They distinguish between knowing something superficially, and feeling, assimilating, and accepting facts that may have wider implications. They recognize that people filter their perceptions through lenses of language, preconception, emotion, and values; what appears negative to one person in one situation may be positive in other circumstances. They see individuals embedded in a society, retaining both their individuality and their common humanity. "Before it never really penetrated into my head that these Nazis were human."

Students who understand in this way can create a morality of personal integrity that values "individuality" and "rational" decisionmaking. They are upset by mass actions and social practices that restrict independent thinking. Recognizing how easy it is to evade responsibility, they try to be honest with themselves. "I think I understand my prejudices and am no longer afraid to admit I have them. This is not a justification but a start." "That really scared me about myself. I tried to relate it to school, to find specific instances where I denied responsibility for an action I performed." Morality, for these students, is a way of life that requires continued awareness and responsibility. "We are so caught up in our own lives. Even when I have free time, I rarely sit back and reflect . . . We have to change the road we're on."

MORAL SENSIBILITIES AT RISK

Each moral vision or perspective has strengths as well as limitations. One can appreciate the passionate clarity of a face value judgment, the generosity of a composite picture judgment that looks for the good side, and the integrity of a multiple lens judgment that recognizes that actions that satisfy one's conscience may not be truly helpful. One can see the lasting importance of the protection of innocent victims, of following your conscience and upholding your values under pressure, and of continuous awareness, reflection, and responsibility.

Responsive Face Value Language

The identification of distinct strengths in each vision of morality led us to look again at the powerful moral responses of some students whose thinking had seemed developmentally immature by comparison to that of their classmates. Angela was one of four girls whose journals represented discrepant data that raised questions about the potential cost of cognitive development. These students repeatedly responded to violence with language that coupled their own outrage, sadness, or disgust with uncomprehending shock (or a statement that the perpetrator must be insane or inhuman implying that he or she is so abnormal as to be outside of humanity) and a call for action to stop the violence. They were likely, especially near the beginning of the course, to assert that they would themselves take the "right" action of stopping, averting, or not participating in violence.

Today we saw the movie *Obedience* [a documentary of Stanley Milgram's classic experiments]. It was awful before I knew it was fake I thought that the person who ran the experiment was really bad to do that because people could have breakdowns from it so you shouldn't ever do that and if you know anyone who is doing it stop them because it's not right! If I was in that position I wouldn't do it at all no matter what would happen to me at all because I know it's wrong!

Another student wrote:

People are so mean . . . I can't believe or understand . . . if I was alive then I wouldn't even want to be part of it [anti-Semitism] . . . I would tell them to stop and if they didn't I would leave.

This language calls attention to the central moral truth of the situation--

captures the impulse to respond both emotionally and actively. It allows no excuses for torture and murder.

The importance of these elements is underscored in Lamb's analysis of how violence can be explained away. Lamb points out that:

When we turn to ask why an individual inflicts such pain on another . . . when we focus on the victimizers . . . images of the pain, of the real hurt, of bruises, of blood, of broken bones become *lary* . . . evil can be so readily reconciled with what we know is good . . . sympathy is too quickly turned into a release from responsibility . . . In their desire to account for social context and for the interaction between persons, [theorists of human behavior] describe acts without agents, harm without guilt.

The responses of students who do not think in terms of social context can focus our attention on the real hurt and guilt and responsibility. In one of these girls' journals, the pain of witnessing violence and the expectation that people should stop the violence were dominant themes--expressed more than a dozen times. The sense of shock that others expressed in conjunction with these themes was less apparent; however, they called Hitler "insane" and thought that allowing genocide to happen was "sick."

I think it's cruel and sick to let that happen. It makes me feel sad for the kids and upset that this was allowed to happen. It also scared me that this could happen. I think if it starts again we should stop it fast, and if this is what's happening in Iran I think we should stop it.

"I did no more than you let me do" means Hitler did no more than the people let him do. They could have stopped the killing *any time* but a lot of people didn't know and others were probably just so brainwashed . . . However, she stops herself in mid-thought, resisting the implication that there is an excuse for non-response. . . . nobody had to let Hitler do it. A lot of people encouraged him and gave him new ideas. I thought maybe someone should have tried to stop him . . . Why not die while trying to help the situation they were in?"

Another entry shows how much she expects of herself and others. "What happens to people who helped makes me sad and helpless because I wasn't there to help and only a few others were brave enough to really help and not just talk."

A reexamination of all the journals revealed that this language was also used by other girls who took accounts at face value or who also drew some composite pictures.

Today we saw a movie called the Warsaw Ghetto. Some parts were really disgusting. I can't understand how the Nazis just took control of all the Jews and nothing happened. I wonder how people went along with it. *How come they couldn't realize what they were doing was bad?* [emphasis in journal] It was awful what the people in the Ghetto went through. It gives me the creeps thinking about it.

Today we saw a film called *Obedience*. I could not believe that some people would just keep going even if the people getting the pain asked them to stop. One man made me mad--the one that kept going. I don't know what I would do because I am not under those conditions. But I say that I would *slay* the man conducting the experiment.

One boy, who used a mixture of face value and composite picture thinking, used language that coupled empathy, shock, and an assertion that he would take action.

I think if I was that person I would have done it because why should you kill someone who has not done a thing to you and kill them because they are not German or your race and also how can you have the mind to actually murder someone. And I would have laid my life down too because if those people have to suffer by getting a bullet through them and having to wait for awhile is horror because these people must of been thinking how it must feel to die by getting shot in the head or the stomach.

Only one of the students who did not use any face value thinking used language that coupled emotion, shock, and action. This girl, who could draw composite pictures and see with multiple lenses, used this kind of language on two occasions. "It was awful. Those were people and other people did that to them. How? No matter what kind of teaching they had, training or whatever. Didn't they ever stop and think that the people in the Warsaw Ghetto were people? And why didn't anybody do anything?" Responses that express emotion or moral outrage and shock and that call for action to stop the violence were found, with one exception, only in girls' journals. They were found, with one exception, only in the journals of students who took the course at face value or who also drew some composite pictures. All but one of the girls whose journals contained at least some face value thinking used this language. Because it contains a direct response to the evidence of violence, taken at face value, the language that couples empathy, shock, and a call for personal action to stop the violence can be called *responsive face value language*.

In order to assess the objectivity of the judgment that face value thinking was present or absent, ten journals were randomly selected from the sam-

TABLE 1

Association of Responsive Face Value Language Use with Gender

	Responsive Face Value Language Present	Responsive Face Value Language Absent
Girls	8	16
Boys	1	18

 $\chi^2 = 5.03, p < 0.025.$

TABLE 2

Association of Responsive Face Value Language Use with Use of Face Value Thinking

	Responsive Face Value Language Present	Responsive Face Value Language Absent
Some face value thinking	8	6
No face value thinking	1	28

Note: Although this table suggests a very strong relationship between the use of language and the use of face value thinking, a statistical comparison would be inappropriate. The identification and assessment of these two ways of writing was not entirely independent. The language was embedded in the journals and its logic contributed to the definition of face value thinking.

agreement was 90 percent on whether or not face value thinking was present (Cohen's Kappa = 0.78).

These same ten journals were then used to assess the reliability with which responsive face value language could be identified. Perfect (100 percent) inter-coder agreement on the presence of responsive face value language was achieved between the author and a third coder who was unfam-

The finding of gender difference is striking but not surprising. Gilligan's work (1982) leads us to expect that language that highlights hurt and that expresses a need to respond or intervene would be used more frequently by girls. Gilligan characterizes the form of moral thinking that predominates among girls and women as the "response" (or care) orientation. Moral problems arise when relationships are threatened or when someone is being hurt or excluded; they are resolved by seeking an inclusive solution that protects each person's welfare or maintains the relationship; the solution is evaluated in terms of its actual consequences. Dilemmas typically focus not on whether to act but on how to act in a way that would be helpful or minimize hurt.

The shock that girls who take accounts at face value express when people deliberately hurt "for no good reason" and when they fail to respond or intervene seems to represent a coming together of a morality that expects care and response and a psychology that directly links motives and actions. Only those who are "mean" or who "don't care as long as it isn't happening to them" can fail to respond to a cry for help.

It should be pointed out here that in most of the examples cited in this article, the care language that called attention to hurt and expects response is integrated with justice language like "fair," "no right," and "revenge." This integrated category was identified by Janie Ward in her 1986 study of inner city high school students' discussions of real-life violence. (See Chapter 9.) In this study, the girls' face value responses are not distinguished solely by the presence of care ideas or by the absence of justice ideas, but by the way in which these themes are organized. While they used language of justice to express moral outrage, their concern remained focused on a perceived lack of care.

Is the use and "loss" of this directly responsive language primarily a phenomenon of girls' development, or do boys who take accounts at face value show a similar strength that may be jeopardized by the development of abstract thinking? Journals are not a good measure for answering this question, as boys who are face value thinkers tend not to use them well. Girls who responded to the course with face value thinking wrote more, and more reflectively, than boys who showed similar thinking. Girls, from an early age, practice tuning into and sharing feelings in their imaginary play. Boys are more likely to focus on actions and plans (Wulf Dorch & A14

shuler, 1984). It may be that, among students who took accounts at face value, the assignment to record personal thoughts and feelings in a journal was more meaningful for girls than for boys.

Still, like girls who took accounts at face value, boys who thought in this way tended to record graphic details. They turned moral outrage into personal anger and urged that offenders be stopped directly. They also expressed sadness. Yet the care language that calls attention to hurt as the moral problem is missing from these boys' responses.

Today in class we saw a movie called *Obedience* . . . If I was under the switches and I heard the screams I would stop under any circumstances . . . if he keeps on urging me I would punch him on the face cause that's a human body. I can't imagine [understand] the people's reaction. The point [the teacher] made during class I thought about it when someone you hated was there and I was a Jew and the guy in the seat was a German and people cheering me on to give him more volts. I would do it cause of what the Germans did to the Jews. I want revenge.

Developmental Transformations of Responsive Face Value Language: Cross-Sectional Data

What happens to this directly responsive language as students develop facility in drawing composite pictures and then in looking with multiple lenses? Do students still respond emotionally? Are they shocked by deliberate and seemingly pointless hurt, torture, and genocide? Do they call for action to stop what they see as harmful or wrong?

Yes. Most of the journals of both boys and girls who draw composite pictures or use multiple lenses show personal distress, profound concern, incredulity, and a desire to "do something" or to become the kind of person who will avoid and protest what he or she sees as evil or take action to help its victims. However, the language and the linkages are different. Comparing the responses of students who did not take course materials at face value with those of students who showed some face value thinking highlights losses as well as gains, continuities, and rediscoveries.

Whereas face value thinkers describe movies and stories as "sad" and "awful," students who draw composite pictures or use multiple lenses are more likely to locate emotions within themselves. Many find that they are most upset when they allow themselves to think about what they have seen. It pains me to think that people would have the gall and selfishness . . . to . . . wipe out a whole race." Students who can think about thinking are

disturbed by ideas as well as by events. I got upset watching this and even more upset thinking about it."

Students can also focus on their own emotions and be pleased by their capacity for emotional response. However, this inward-turning is sometimes criticized by multiple lens users. To shed tears for, pity, or avoid the film will not change anything." "All we did [by discussing questions like 'Did they have hope?'] was take a rather narrow psychological joy trip." These adolescent critics are acutely aware of the ways in which their feelings can be manipulated. This can lead them to doubt the authenticity of an account or response and to distance themselves from realities that are painful to think about which they know they cannot change. At the same time, it can also lead to a search for an adequate response.

This kind of distancing is seen by Kohlberg (1981) as a developmental advance, for it allows people to give the same weight to the claims of strangers as to those of people they care about. The flip side of this is evident in the *Facing History* journals of multiple lens users. These students recognize that emotional response may be a prerequisite for action. "Some issues make me fight with all my heart while others don't."

One girl who could use multiple lenses described how she made herself watch the films in a way that overcame her usual tendency to distance herself. Like Angela, this girl reifies and enhances the images presented to her, making the harm vivid. She indicates that she is reacting to friends who think she cares less than they do. Although she presents her response as new, it may be that she is drawing on a capacity that was more available at an earlier point in her development.

[A friend] told me that since I didn't show everybody how I felt I was not responding and sharing with the rest of the class . . . I think for once the enormity . . . finally hit me. I've read books and I saw *The Holocaust*. I've even seen real live people who . . . are past caring what happens to them. But it never really sank in. When I was watching *The Warsaw Ghetto*, I imagined all these people who had families and little problems of life. Just being killed. I imagined what it would be like to have an innocent peaceful life disrupted like that. After realizing all that I couldn't . . . shake it off (or pretend to) like I usually do.

The inability to understand how or why any sane person could participate in mass killing is a common response to learning about the Holocaust. However, for students who do not take what they see at face value, "How could people do it?" and "Why didn't anyone stop them?" are real

questions. These questions lose some of their force as protests as they open the way to a more complicated view of human nature which acknowledges that ordinary people can be extraordinarily cruel. "How could any normal man go along with the Nazi persecution? Very simply it seems--they were ordered."

The observation that people can be forced or "brainwashed" or pressured to "go against their real self" and the recognition that "both sides" of the story must be taken into account help composite picture drawers to explain some of the horrors they see. Multiple lens users are further able to see how people can deceive themselves. "The real picture at the end really disturbed me. The pictures were so disgusting they made me look away. I guess that's what happened, people just looked away and didn't face it."

Yet sometimes no explanation will suffice for the horrible realities that students see. Their expressions of outrage and shock sound like face value responses, but they are not followed by a call for action. Instead, there is often a recognition that resistance is a less likely response than tacit acceptance of reluctant complicity. "Those people were not human. They could not have been. What they did only the lowest, most barbaric animal could do." "It was like watching the Holocaust happen. I couldn't believe it; they did it just because they were told to. Those men could have been dead! . . . It was absolutely horrible watching it because it meant that nothing had changed. If Hitler were in power now people would do what he told them."

Another contrast is that while face value thinkers tend to call for personal action to stop violence, composite picture and multiple lens users are more likely to call for governmental or collective action, although they hold individuals (both victimizers and silent bystanders) responsible.

I felt bad because . . . my country did nothing. It makes me wonder about civilization. You can't tell me people didn't know what they did.

The people who did this I feel are sub-human. How could they do this to a race? Why couldn't it have been made an international crime before because it would have saved a lot of people from this at the time.

The certainty about "what I would do" is eroded both by cognitive development and by the course *Facing History*. Many students learn from materials like *Obedience* and from their discussions of history and

human behavior that "I don't know what I'd do because I'm not in those circumstances." Often, as they recognize themselves in others who jumped to conclusions or who blindly followed orders or were too "brainwashed" or frightened to question and act, they learn to face their own limitations. Yet several note how, having faced history and themselves, they and their classmates are less likely to be bystanders. "Before I was a 'watcher,' now I'm a 'doer.'"

Developmental Transformation of Responsive Face Value Language

Tracing changes in one student's journal over time, we can see what happens to her involvement and need for action as she moves away from face value responses and draws composite pictures. In early entries, Susan expressed uncomplicated condemnation of anyone who was portrayed as a victimizer. For example, she wrote of the hunters in *Love to Kill*, "Those people must be mental!"

Susan's response to a reading about an exercise in which a teacher's attempt to simulate totalitarianism with his class is a clear voicing of a responsive face value perspective--and contains the seeds of its undoing.

We are doing a mind control thing. I think it is wicked. I would never do it. I would tell the teacher to screw. I can't believe that almost grown adults could do that. That people could be so blind as to not see what is happening to them. If the man could have done this for evil, if you start thinking almost anyone could do this and they could take over the world. It's scary to think there's something that big in me.

Other entries in Susan's journal show a close connection between moral outrage and action. "Putting fourteen-year old boys on the front! The man should be shot! And to think the same thing is going on in Cambodia. Can you get me Senator Kennedy's address so I can write to him about it?"

Susan was very concerned going into this unit because she doesn't "like gross things or blood." Yet she wanted to find out "why Hitler did the mass killings, because knowing that will make it easier to take, I hope." She takes comfort in her answer--that "Hitler was wacky," this makes the Holocaust a fluke perpetrated by an inhuman monster rather than something humans have done and have to face. As she collected new information she reiterated her thesis. Eventually, though, she "change[d her] mind about

that evil things can be done by people who are neither evil nor insane. Now I kinda feel sorry for him; he was such a sick man.' Thus, Hitler becomes a man, sick but still human. Susan's change of mind is followed by entries that show new concern for her classmates and a new willingness and ability to look at things from different points of view. At the same time, she became 'ill with sadness' when watching *Warsaw Ghetto*, echoing an earlier face value entry. 'All those brains dying, those pumping red hearts stopping--it simply aches me to think of it.'

Susan was so upset by the film that she left the room, crying uncontrollably. As she reflected on this experience in her journal and later in a class discussion, she stated that she hates to cry and rarely does so in public. The film, and the true story it told, compelled her to respond. Where once she might have assumed that those of her classmates who didn't show emotions didn't have any, she now worried about how boys, who 'aren't supposed to cry,' could deal with their pain.

Susan's last entry shows the gains, losses, and continuities in her moral sensitivities. '[Joseph Schultz] thought that killing a person was wrong no matter what you do after. I don't know how I would feel or what I would do, but I think I might kill them if I were brainwashed; but now in my state of mind, I think I might break down crying--but don't know. He made one of the hardest choices in life and I think he made it right.'

She has gained a more complicated vision that allows her to see the real difficulties of moral choices, and a new willingness to face her own limitations. Her earlier screams of protest at killing have changed to crying as she agonizes over a difficult decision. She retains her sympathy for the oppressed, empathizes with the decisionmaker, and takes a moral stand.

Developmental Transformation of Responsive Face Value Language: A Class Discussion

By chance, the author observed a class discussion of *Joseph Schultz* in which the face value perspective was initially represented but then was apparently lost as the complexities of the situation were explored. This discussion took place in a combined seventh/eighth grade classroom in a public school. The teacher, who was clearly adept at fostering critical thinking, controlled the discussion. She would ask a question, then call on a student or a series of students to respond. She would have a brief

discussion with each respondent, summarizing and reacting to the statement, rephrasing it in more abstract language, and relating it to what others had said. She would also add discrepant perspectives of her own or ones she had heard in other classes. This resulted in a teacher-focused discussion that built on the students' ideas, followed their questions, and continually pushed their thinking. For example, one student (responding with face value thinking) stated that if all the soldiers had refused to shoot, 'the captain wouldn't have had enough bullets to shoot all of them.' This was paraphrased by her teacher as raising the possibility of 'collective action,' which the class then discussed.

All of the girls and a few of the boys actively contributed to the discussion. They were eager to speak; some at times found it hard to wait for their turns. They elaborated their ideas, incorporated new possibilities, played with alternate interpretations, and asked questions.

Toward the end of this wide-ranging discussion, one boy who had not been speaking much said he felt Schultz had thrown his life away because he had not saved anyone with his death. The class discussed the impact of Schultz's act on his fellow soldiers (who were ordered to shoot him and did); they focused on the idea that, having shot a friend, the soldiers may now find it easier, rather than harder, to kill. The difficulty of Schultz's predicament was well represented by the students. Schultz was seen as an individual whose conscience led him to go against his society and who stood up for what he knew was right. At the same time, his act was represented as a foolish form of resistance that saved lives neither immediately nor in the long run. Earlier, students had suggested other ways in which Schultz might have been able to effectively resist. Some of these ways had been critiqued as unrealistic by other students.

Three perceptions commonly expressed in face value journal responses to *Joseph Schultz* got lost in this discussion: (a) the image of Schultz as a brave hero who would not kill innocent people, even to save his own life; (b) the reality that Schultz was a victim and that his comrades shot him; and (c) the fact that others could have made the same choice. These visions are captured in the following journal entry:

I thought he was incredibly brave. I'm a little ashamed to say it, but I don't think I could have given up my own life like he did. When he was getting ready to walk towards the blindfolded people he didn't even look scared, he

I think they should have all dropped their guns. Those people were innocent and unarmed, there was no reason to shoot them.

This discussion focuses attention on both the promise and the risk of 'higher stage' thinking. When we see a situation from both sides (com-posite picture), we can appreciate the difficult predicament of the unwilling or 'brainwashed' victimizer; we can also absolve him of responsibility. When we look with multiple lenses, we can distinguish a solution that is truly helpful from a 'noble' but futile or ultimately destructive gesture. However, we can also rationalize non-involvement by convincing ourselves that nothing will work.

This tension was captured by an eighth-grade girl whose journal showed her development of multiple lens thinking. A visitor from Oxfam had come to tell her class about the genocide that was going on in Cambodia. This student wrote in her journal: "A comment . . . was really good: 'a big difference between Cambodia and the Holocaust is we can do some-thing about Cambodia.' Well we should do something about it. We could send money to Oxfam, but \$23 is not going to make a lot of difference in saving human lives. Maybe I am unconsciously trying not to 'get involved.' But, I honestly don't think \$23 is worth sending."

She could hold on to the reality that demanded a response at the same time that she recognized the difficulty of responding adequately. She was able to face herself, to see how easy it would be "not to get involved," and how important it was to "do something."

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

A "more powerful" framework, in the Piagetian sense, can also be a more dangerous one. The ability to see both sides can bring a new understanding of others and, therefore, an enhanced ability to take their needs into consideration. Yet it can also allow a concern for the rights or welfare of the victimizer to obscure the experience of the victim and the reality that the two sides are not equal. The use of multiple lenses can bring a new assumption of responsibility. But on the other hand, this ability can, as several multiple lens users pointed out in their journals, be used to rationalize inaction, evade decisions, or shrewdly manipulate others into complacency in the face of evil.

The survivor whose message begins this chapter reminds us that formal education was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the Nazi Holocaust. Physicians who must have been able to use multiple lenses poisoned healthy children; this was considered a "medical matter." Arendt (1963) tells us that the perpetrators of the Holocaust acted, for the most part, not out of fear or passion or even self-interest, but out of loyalty to their organizations, in conformity with prevailing norms, or as builders of a state whose ideology demanded totalitarian control, "language rules" (euphemisms), and eventually genocide. She demonstrates how education enabled people to overcome their moral impulses.

And just as the law in civilized countries assumes that the voice of conscience tells everybody "Thou shalt not kill," even though man's natural desires and inclinations may at times be murderous, so the law of Hitler's land demanded that the voice of conscience tell everybody: "Thou shalt kill," although the organizers of the massacres knew full well that murder is against the normal desires and inclinations of most people. Evil in the Third Reich had lost the quality by which most people recognize it--the quality of temptation. Many Germans and many Nazis, probably an overwhelming majority of them, must have been tempted *not* to murder, *not* to rob, *not* to let their neighbors go off to their doom (for that the Jews were transported to their doom they knew, of course, even though many of them may not have known the gruesome details), and not to become accomplices in all these crimes by benefiting from them. But, God knows, they had learned how to resist temptation. (Arendt, 1963, p. 150)

If we are to meet the challenge of educating in ways that help our children and adolescents become more human, then we must attend to and build on the "finely human" aspects of their thinking. As we help them to see and understand the realities, complexities, and laws of the world, we must also help them to hang on to their moral sensitivities and impulses.

In her novel *To Kill a Mockingbird*, Harper Lee (1960) illustrates how a white child's moral "instincts" make him unable to watch the brutal cross-examination of an innocent black man. When the boy runs from the courtroom, sick to his stomach and in tears, he is comforted by a man who has no use for the community's bigotry, and so lives apart and pretends to be an alcoholic. Through this man's eyes, we see how the child's growth and education are likely to dull his moral sensitivity. "Things haven't caught up with that one's instinct yet. Let him get a little older and he won't get sick and cry. Maybe things'll strike him as being--not quite right, say, but he won't cry, not when he gets a few years on him."

The *Facing History* project continues to develop educational materials and methods that sustain children's visions as well as their tears, as it helps them to think about the things in their world that are "not quite right." Perhaps students educated in this way will grow up to cry out when they see pain or injustice, and to find ways to help the victims.

NOTES

1. Lieberman, M. "Final Evaluation Report of the First Year (1977-78), Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior." In "Annual Project Report to the Massachusetts Department of Education," submitted by M. S. Strom (1978); also in M. Lieberman, "Evaluation Report #78680D to the Joint Dissemination Review Panel" (1986). These documents are available at Facing History and Ourselves Resource Center, Brookline, Mass.
2. Strom, M. S. "Excerpts from the End of the Year Student Evaluations for 8th Grade Social Studies," Brookline Public Schools (1977). Available at Facing History Resource Center.
3. Whittier, D. *Kennard House Seniors* (1981). Videotape available at Facing History Resource Center.
4. Intersection Associates. *A Visit with Facing History* (1986). Videotape available at Facing History Resource Center.
5. Des Pres, T. "Lessons of the Holocaust." *New York Times* (April 27, 1976).
6. Lamb, S. "Harm Without Guilt: A Critique of the General Systems Theory Analysis of Violence in the Family." Unpublished paper, Harvard Graduate School of Education (1984).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply grateful to Margot Stern Strom and William S. Parsons, the developers of Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behavior, for helping me to see the potential of young adolescents and of curriculum. I owe a special debt to Barbara Perry and Joyce Rakowski for their sensitive teaching of the course, and especially to their students who so generously shared their remarkable journals.

6

THE ORIGINS OF MORALITY IN EARLY CHILDHOOD RELATIONSHIPS

Carol Gilligan and Grant Wiggins

This article was prompted by an observation made while listening to the discussion at the conference "The Origins of Morality in Early Childhood" (Harvard University, 1984). When psychologists traced morality to the child's discovery of the idea of justice, girls and women were seen to have less sense of justice than boys and men. This deficit in moral reasoning was explained in part by women's preoccupation with relationships and feelings (Freud, 1925/1961; Piaget, 1932/1965; Kohlberg & Kramer, 1969). Now, as the focus of psychologists' attention shifts to moral emotions or sentiments (Kagan, 1984), sex differences seem to have disappeared. Empathy and concern about feelings, once seen as the source of limitation in women's moral reasoning, are now viewed as the essence of morality but no longer associated particularly with women. The question is: What has changed?

Recent reports of research finding no evidence of sex differences in empathy or moral reasoning (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Kohlberg, 1984; Walker, 1984) are presented as a sign of progress, both in research methods and in social justice. Such findings of no sex differences may appear to dissolve the difficult conceptual problems that findings of sex differences pose. But the inference that there are no sex differences in moral development is problematic on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically,